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United States fresh apple sales generate approxi-
mately $1.7 billion annually (USDA NASS 2006), 
and the productive value of apples ranks sixteenth 
among our nation’s crops (USDA NASS 1998). 
Washington State has been the leading supplier of 
fresh market apples since the 1920s. The produc-
tion in Washington during the 2005 season topped 
5.8 billion pounds, which constituted more than 58 
percent of the total U.S. apple production (USDA 
NASS 2006). Apples represent a crop of signiﬁcant 
value to the country and Washington State.
The Washington apple industry may owe its suc-
cess in part to promotional activities. From 1937 un-
til 2003, the Washington Apple Commission (WAC) 
operated as one of the most successful commodity-
promotion programs in the United States. (Eddy 
2003). The Washington Apple Commission spent 
millions of dollars each year to provide direct ad-
vertising, merchandising, in-store displays, export 
promotion, and other forms of advertising. Success-
ful advertising alters consumer behavior through 
consumer education, building trust in the label and 
brand, or a persuasion of a superior product (Liu 
and Forker 1988). This study examines the ability 
of the Washington Apple Commission promotion to 
affect the demand for Washington State apples and 
measures the revenue changes attributable to these 
efforts. We identify the annual loss in revenue due to 
the elimination of the Washington Apple Commis-
sion activities and suggest how voluntary promotion 
dollars should be spent for generic advertising.
Generic goods such as apples may need indus-
try-level promotion, since these products vary little 
across producers and may not be efﬁciently adver-
tised privately. The hope is that group promotion 
will positively affect the demand for all Washington 
apples and each producer will beneﬁt with larger 
revenues. Many producers of generic goods combine 
their promotion efforts in an attempt to inﬂuence the 
demand for their product. Several studies explain 
the promotional impacts of generic advertising on 
demand for several commodities, including pears, 
pork, catﬁsh, salmon, and ﬂuid milk (Erikson 1999; 
Hoover, Hayenga and Johnson 1992; Kinnucan and 
Miao 1999; Kinnucan and Myrland 2003; Johnson, 
Stonehouse and Hassan 1992). Generally these stud-
ies ﬁnd small positive effects on demand associated 
with generic commodity promotion.
The usefulness of advertising can be evaluated 
by examining the change in the responsiveness of 
the quantity demanded to a price change (Morrison 
1984). Chang and Green (1989), Capps and Moen 
(1992), and Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2004) 
consider the long-term effects of advertising on 
demand elasticity. They ﬁnd that generic advertis-
ing leads to an increased responsiveness to changes 
in price. Liu and Forker (1988), Gallet (1999), and 
Schmit, Reberte, and Kaiser (1997) suggest that 
price elasticity may increase or decrease depend-
ing on the product differentiation generated by the 
advertising. Richards (1999) illustrates the effects 
of advertising in terms of long-run and short-run 
own- and cross-price elasticities for Washington 
State apples and four other fruits. He reports that 
advertising is marginally more effective than retail 
promotion, but has positive spillover effects to 
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that advertising has both a shift and a rotation ef-
fect on demand. Rotations may be positive, zero, or 
negative depending on the content of advertising. 
In our model, we allow advertising efforts to shift 
and rotate the demand function in order to capture 
the total effects of these programs. 
Focusing exclusively on the promotion of apples, 
Ward (1993) estimates the gains from Washington 
Apple Commission television and radio advertising 
average $6.60 per dollar of promotion expenditure. 
Using a single-equation method to estimate demand, 
Van Voorthuizen, Schotzko, and Mittelhammer 
(2003) show that radio and television advertise-
ments do not signiﬁcantly affect Washington apple 
demand; however, the level of expenditure on print 
media does matter. By contrast, with a multi-equa-
tion approach they show that while promotional 
prices do not signiﬁcantly affect demand, radio and 
television advertisements are jointly signiﬁcant. 
This paper speciﬁcally examines the effective-
ness of all promotion expenditures by the Washing-
ton Apple Commission to inﬂuence the demand for 
Washington State apples. We compare the industry 
with and without Washington Apple Commission 
advertising. We quantify the revenue attributable 
to the Washington Apple Commission generic ad-
vertising and provide producers guidance for what 
activities they may want to jointly pursue volun-
tarily. The next section contains a description of 
the speciﬁc characteristics unique to the Washing-
ton Apple Commission, followed by an empirical 
model of the demand for Washington State apples. 
The estimation results follow. We use the regres-
sion results to calculate the change in demand and 
revenue due to the Washington Apple Commission’s 
promotion. The conclusion of the paper provides 
suggestions for maximizing the effectiveness of 
current voluntary generic promotion.
An Overview of the Washington Apple 
Commission
The Washington Apple Commission (WAC) be-
gan operations in 1937 and court orders stopped 
its promotional efforts in 2003 (Prichard 2003). 
Prior to 2003, the Washington Apple Commis-
sion conducted several activities including direct 
advertising, merchandising, in-store displays, 
national publicity, consumer publicity, research, 
school and industry publicity, export promotion, 
and assistance to other organizations during much 
of that period (Washington Apple Commission 
2005). Figure 1 shows the real expenditures for 
selected promotion activities and total sales of the 
Washington Apple Commission since 1970. The 
Washington Apple Commission spent several mil-
lion dollars annually and increased its expenditures 
over time. Direct advertising generally represented 
the largest expenditure in recent years, and promo-
tion expenditure was the second-largest category. 
Expenditures on these two types of activities sharply 
increased beginning in the late 1980s. Total sales 
also increased during this period, suggesting a 
relationship may exist between Washington Apple 
Commission promotion and sales.
Growers paid for the Washington Apple Com-
mission-managed promotion through self-imposed 
mandatory fees. Real mandatory assessment rates 
varied historically from two cents in 1937 to 40 
cents in 1998, per 42-pound box equivalent. The 
size of the assessment and the quantity of apples 
produced determined the amount available for 
Washington Apple Commission advertising expen-
ditures each year (Bergstrom 2006).1 The Wash-
ington Apple Commission produced the largest 
promotional campaign for generic items in United 
States history in 1999, with a $36 million budget, 
which was estimated to reach 40 percent of United 
States consumers (Litwak 1998). 
During the 1990s two separate court cases 
probed the issue of using grower assessments to 
fund promotion. In a proactive move, the Washing-
ton Apple Commission tested the legality of their 
practice of funding promotion from mandatory fee 
assessments. The Washington Apple Commission 
identiﬁed two growers willing to raise the legal 
question (at Commission expense) over the use 
of the mandatory assessments. Later, a group of 
organic growers and three warehouses joined the 
suit (Warner 2003). 
On March 31, 2003, a federal judge ruled that 
the Washington Apple Commission fee-assessment 
program violated the producers’ First Amendment 
rights. The judge stated that producers could not be 
1 Washington Apple Commission assessments were calculated 
according to information from the Department of Agriculture’s 
compliance-inspection database record, which detailed the 
number of state apples within USDA compliance standards and 
labeled by sticker. Individual packers received a corresponding 
invoice, and they would then collect fees from growers. Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 42   July 2008
forced to fund activities that beneﬁted competitors 
and found it illegal to require growers to pay to pro-
mote a message, even if that message was intended 
to increase consumption of their own crop (Prichard 
2003). In compliance with these ﬁndings, the fee-
assessment program to fund promotion ended. The 
current activities of the Washington Apple Com-
mission consist of export promotion, administrative 
duties and coordination, and website maintenance 
at www.bestapples.com (Bergstrom 2006). 
Model, Data, and Estimation
In order to characterize the effects of the Washing-
ton Apple Commission promotion prior to 2003, we 
specify a demand function to estimate the effects 
of these activities on producers’ total revenue.2 
We include the price of the primary substitute 
for Washington fresh apples, aggregate consumer 
food expenditures, population, Washington Apple 
Commission advertising, and interaction terms. The 
general form of this equation can be written as 
(1) q = β0 + βpt +  δ'adt + γ'(pt · adt) + a'xt  , 
where qt is the quantity of Washington fresh apples 
at time t, pt is the price of Washington fresh apples, 
adt  is a vector of advertising expenditures for a set 
of advertising categories, xt are control variables, 
β0 and β are parameters, and δ, γ, α are vectors of 
parameters. 
The advertising variables may shift and rotate 
demand via interaction terms. The marginal effect 
of advertising can be used to ﬁnd the price-point 
of rotation in demand with respect to a change 
in advertising expenditure. At this price, rotation 
and shift cancel each other out in terms such that 
∂q/∂adi = δi + γi p = 0. Rearranging this shows the 
point of rotation for each advertising effect as 
pr = −δi/γi. An outward shift in demand is char-
acterized by δi > 0, and a clockwise rotation is 





































Figure 1. Total WAC Promotion Expenditures for Selected Activities and Total Sales.
Data Source: WAC (2005).
2 We base our demand equation on Schmit, Reberte, and Kaiser 
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Data
The data used in this analysis come from Washing-
ton Apple Commission records of expenditures, the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
publications, the Federal Reserve Economic Data 
website, and other sources. We use annual observa-
tions for the years 1971 to 2004. We deﬂate all price 
or expenditure variables with the consumer price 
index (CPI) for food using 1982–84 as the base. 
Table 1 contains a brief description and listing of 
variable sources. We present summary statistics for 
each variable in Table 2.
The dependent variable WA fresh quantity rep-
resents fresh apples sold by growers in the state of 
Washington (millions of pounds). We exclude juice, 
applesauce, and other forms of low-end production 
that do not consist of whole ripe apples and which 
are not a part of the Washington Apple Commission 
programs. The WA fresh pricet variable represents 
the annual average price per pound for the same 
category of apples. 
We include the national quantity-weighted aver-
age price of apples from states other than Washing-
ton, U.S. price. The food expenditures per capita 
variable serves as a targeted proxy for income.3 This 
expenditure per capita includes only food at home 
(meaning sales, home production, and donations). 
We also include the U.S. Population (millions) for 
each year. 
The Washington Apple Commission promoted 
Washington apples using several different meth-
ods including direct advertising, merchandising, 
display, promotions, organizations, and consumer 
publicity. We obtained measures of these variables 
from Washington Apple Commission historical data 
(2006) and Bergstrom (2006). To capture both shifts 
and rotations of demand in response to advertising, 
we included interaction variables, each deﬁned as 
price times an individual advertising variable. 
Direct advertising includes expenditures on ra-
dio, television, billboard ads, and creative services 
rendered. Prior to the ruling against the Commis-
sion, the Washington Apple Commission contracted 
with large marketing agencies for these direct ad-
vertising activities. In the current decade, direct 
advertising also included promotions and “focus 
group” research that analyzed purchasing decisions 
of customers (Bergstrom 2006).
Merchandising involves expenditures on trade 
promotions received by middlemen and apples 
retailers. Categories of merchandising programs 
include corporate programs, retail in-store demon-
strations, training programs for representatives, and 
investments in new markets in the United States (for 
example, merchandising focused on Latinos in Los 
Angeles). Regional representatives contacted retail 
stores in their areas and offered trips or other special 
incentives to retailers for selling Washington apples 
(Bergstrom 2006).
Display characterizes expenditures on point-of-
sale promotion such as brochures and signs at retail 
stores. Washington Apple Commission-managed 
booths at conventions also constitute a small part 
of the display expenditures (Bergstrom 2006).
Promotions include any money given to retail-
ers for cooperation in advertising according to a 
particular offer by the Washington Apple Com-
mission. The Gold’s Gym three-a-day program is 
one example of promotion in this category, where 
participants are encouraged to eat an apple at every 
meal in order to lose weight (Bergstrom 2006).
The organizations variable represents contribu-
tions to industry-related groups. Industry organiza-
tions such as the Northwest Horticultural Council 
and the U.S. Apple Association coordinated with the 
Washington Apple Commission for speciﬁc activi-
ties including lobbying or gaining market access 
in foreign countries. In turn, the Washington Apple 
Commission donated funds annually to these orga-
nizations (Bergstrom 2006).
Consumer publicity constitutes expenditures on 
salaries, publicity, recipe development, conventions, 
apple giveaways, grower relations, photography, 
and crisis management. Consumer publicity also 
includes funds used to promote positive publica-
tions in magazines and other print media, as well 
as dues and subscriptions to groups that inform the 
Washington Apple Commission each time apples 
are in the news (Bergstrom 2006).4
3 Including food expenditures but not income effectively 
assumes that changes in the price of apples do not affect overall 
food expenditures substantially. 
4 Washington Apple Commission expenditure categories not 
included in the demand model include administration and 
revenue (which is not directly promotional), export promotion 
(which does not directly affect domestic demand), research 
(which affects production in the long run rather than demand), 
national publicity (a category which has not been used in recent 
years), and food service and school promotion.Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 44   July 2008




Weight of apples in millions of pounds, produced 
and sold fresh (unprocessed) by Washington grow-
ers. 
USDA NASS (2005) http:
//usda.mannlib.cornell.edu
WA fresh price Return at packinghouse door for apples in the state 
of Washington (deﬂated), cents per pound. 
USDA NASS (2005) http:
//usda.mannlib.cornell.edu. 
U.S. price Average price producers receive at the point of ﬁrst 
sale for fresh apples in the U.S., except Washingtona 
(deﬂated).




Total expenditures for food at home for the U.S. 
divided by total population and deﬂated by the CPI 
for food described in this table below.
USDA Economic Re-




Population U.S. population. U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Survey of Current Business.
Direct
advertising
Expenditure on billboards, ad-buys, television and 
radio commercials ($ 1,000 deﬂated).
WAC (2005). Data made avail-
able by Laverne Bergstrom of 
WAC in Washington
Merchandising Gratuities for negotiations, expenses for sales repre-
sentatives ($ 1,000 deﬂated).
“
Display Retail point-of-sale promotion such as brochures, 
banners, signs; WAC booths at conventions ($1,000 
deﬂated).
“
Promotions Gratuities incentives ($ 1,000 deﬂated). “
Organizations Contributions to afﬁliated organizations of Washing-
ton apples such as Northwest Horticultural Council 





Consumer Publicity and public relations ($ 1,000 
deﬂated).
“
a Values were calculated by subtracting the WA price weighted by quantity from the U.S. average price weighted by quantity and 
dividing by the pounds of all other states’ apples to get the mean price for other states.Wilmot, Chouinard, Yoder, and Schotzko Effects of Generic Advertisement on Demand   45
Estimation
Estimation of this model of demand requires a care-
ful speciﬁcation of the dynamic characteristics of 
the data. Economic theory provides little guidance 
about the speciﬁc dynamic structure of the model. 
Therefore, we performed preliminary speciﬁca-
tion analysis to characterize the dynamics of the 
demand equation. In particular, we examined vari-
ous autoregressive distributed lag models for the 
demand equation. 
We ﬁnd minor heteroskedasticity in the residu-
als. Exploratory feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) estimates for various heteroskedasticity 
speciﬁcations showed little effect on parameter 
estimates, so rather than applying FGLS we per-
formed OLS but reported White’s heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors.
We considered the possibility that the WA fresh 
price may be endogenous in the demand equation, as 
price and quantity are often jointly determined. We 
initially included several supply-related variables as 
instruments for price (including lags of Washington 
apple prices, an interest rate measure and lags of the 
interest variable, and apple-bearing acreage) and ran 
a two-stage least-squares estimation. However, we 
found that based on a Hausman test we do not reject 
the null hypothesis at any conventional levels (p = 
0.35), so we include the original fresh price in the 
demand equation. Additionally, we veriﬁed that the 
Washington Apple Commission activities did not 
affect price, in order to be conﬁdent that the change 
in quantity captured the entire revenue effects of the 
programs. The joint signiﬁcance of the advertising 
variables in the preliminary price equation is not 
signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.67), so Washington Apple 
Commission programs do not appear to affect price 
signiﬁcantly. In summary, because we fail to reject 
price exogeneity and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of 
Washington Apple Commission promotions on 
price, we use OLS with the original fresh apple 
price series to estimate the demand function, and use 
the original fresh apple price series to calculate the 
revenue changes with and without the Washington 
Apple Commission activities.
Results
Table 3 displays the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation and 
results.5 Based on a battery of Bruesh-Godfrey 
tests and Ljung–Box portmanteau (Q) tests, the ﬁ-
nal speciﬁcation includes one lag of the dependent 
variable (WA fresh quantity). This speciﬁcation gen-
erates white-noise errors out to lag 15 (p-values > 
0.44 for Ljung–Box Q statistic). An Engle-Granger 
test for cointegration based on the residuals of the 
 Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Data (34 observations).
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
WA fresh quantity 11.3 3.2 5.3 15.8
WA fresh price 14.7 3.8 9.2 22.4
Direct advertising 3,632.2 24.1 0.0 112.4
Merchandising 1,025.9 588.6 0.0 2,039.1
Display 220.3 102.8 0.0 493.4
Promotions 1,446.5 1,431.8 0.0 5,692.7
Organizations 334.8 310.5 44.1 961.3
Consumer publicity 423.6 396.7 0.0 1,131.0
U.S. apple price 16.1 2.8 12.5 24.1
Food expenditures 968.1 85.5 877.0 1,137.7
Population 248.0 26.9 207.5 295.0
5 We used STATA version 10 for estimation.Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 46   July 2008
demand equation produces a test statistic of –6.25. A 
one-percent critical value for this demand speciﬁca-
tion is given in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 
722) as –3.90, indicating a strong rejection of the null 
of no cointegration. The Engle-Granger approach, 
though convenient for our model, is often criticized 
for having weak power compared to other VAR-
based tests. Our strong rejection of the null hypoth-
esis of no cointegration given the low power of this 
test (meaning that we are more likely to fail to reject 
the null) provides substantial conﬁdence that our 
regression represents a cointegrating vector among 
the variables (a necessary condition for consistent 
parameter estimation in dynamic models).6
Because the demand equation includes a lagged 
dependent variable, the parameter estimates them-
selves correspond to short-run impact coefﬁcients. 
All discussion below relates to short-run (annual) 
effects. The long-run effect of any variable or set of 
variables can be estimated by dividing the short-run 
estimated effect by 1 – λ, where λ is the coefﬁcient 
on the lagged dependent variable. For example, if 
the estimated marginal effect of a variable in the 
regression is β, then the long-run equilibrium ef-
fect is β (1 – λ).
Table 3. Washington Fresh Apple Demand Coefﬁcient Estimates Using OLS.
Variable Estimate Standard error P-value
WA fresh quantity lagged 1 0.30*** 0.09 0.003
WA fresh price −39.76 23.64 0.112
Direct advertising 177.81* 89.89 0.065
Merchandising −2485.66*** 776.36 0.006
Display 3045.27 2022.73 0.152
Promotions 537.56** 223.45 0.029
Organizations 2667.34*** 559.90 0.000
Consumer publicity 1002.42* 520.70 0.072
Price X Direct advertising −0.01 0.01 0.120
Price X Merchandising 0.14** 0.05 0.014
Price X Display −0.27** 0.11 0.029
Price X Promotions −0.03 0.02 0.121
Price X Organizations −0.14*** 0.03 0.001
Price X Consumer publicity 0.00 0.04 0.949
U.S. price 52.59*** 16.27 0.005
Food expenditures 1.23 1.21 0.324
Population 15.72*** 4.84 0.005
Constant −3477.97* 1844.13 0.078
F = 638, p<0.0000; R-squared = 0.99.
Signiﬁcant levels are denoted: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
6 Based on Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots, all variables 
except population are integrated of order one or zero. With 
population, however, integration of order 2 is not rejected 
at conventional signiﬁcance levels. Including this variable 
apparently has sufﬁcient impact that it leads to a null set of 
cointegrating vectors in the demand equation. After examining 
the data, we are conﬁdent that the non-stationarity of the ﬁrst 
difference of population is a ﬁgment of the interpolation method 
used to estimate the data between census points. All things 
considered, we have included population in the regression 
equation for theoretical completeness, with some conﬁdence 
that its inclusion is a net improvement empirically over its 
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First, we consider the effects of own-price and 
lagged quantity on WA fresh quantity. As the own-
price increases the quantity demanded decreases 
according to the law of demand. The lagged quantity 
of apples relates positively to the current quantity. 
Now we examine the non-price and non-advertis-
ing control variables on WA fresh quantity, shown 
at the bottom of Table 3 (U.S. price for non-Wash-
ington Apples, population, and food expenditures). 
Because non-Washington apples act as substitutes 
for Washington apples, we expect an increase in 
U.S. price to increase the quantity of Washington 
apples demanded. The coefﬁcient is positive and 
signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. The population 
variable also positively and signiﬁcantly increases 
the quantity demanded. The parameter for the food 
expenditure variable is positive as expected, but not 
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. 
All but one of the advertising categories shifts 
demand outward (as indicated by a positive coef-
ﬁcient). The parameter estimates associated with 
all advertising-related variables (including shift and 
interaction terms) are strongly jointly signiﬁcant (p 
= 0.0000), and ﬁve of these shifts are individually 
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels (di-
rect advertising, merchandising, promotions, and 
organizations, and consumer publicity). The effect 
of merchandising is signiﬁcantly negative near the 
sampling range of our independent variables. 
In contrast, point estimates for all other adver-
tising categories show an outward shift in demand 
and a clockwise rotation, though these rotation 
effects tend to be relatively small and weak. The 
rotation points are far higher than any price points 
in the sample. For all advertising categories but 
merchandising, the marginal effects are positive 
within the sample space but diminishing slightly in 
their effectiveness as price increases and as market 
quantity decreases.7 
Table 4 contains the marginal effects of price 
and advertising effects calculated using the sample 
means of the explanatory variables provided in Table 
2. The marginal effect of WA fresh price is −39.76, 
which indicates that a one-cent increase in price 
leads to a decrease in quantity demanded of about 
40 million pounds with all other variables at the 
sample means. All variable but merchandising have 
positive marginal impacts on quantities demanded 
at sample means. Of the advertising categories with 
expected signs, four are statistically signiﬁcant at 
conventional levels. The marginal effects with 
expected positive signs range from 1.77 to 30.49 
million pounds for the marginal dollar spent.
For 2002, the last year of Washington Apple 
Commission promotion, the predicted quantity de-
manded given no Washington Apple Commission 
promotion for 2002 reaches 4.01 billion pounds (the 
actual quantity equaled 3.90 billion), and the pre-
dicted quantities demanded with Washington Apple 
Commission promotion set to zero for all categories 
is 3.52 billion pounds. This suggests that Washing-
Table 4. Marginal Effects of Price and Advertising on the Quantity of Fresh Apples Calculated at 
Sample Means.
Variable Estimate Standard error P-value
WA fresh price −40 24 0.111
Direct advertising 177 90 0.065
Merchandising −2484 776 0.006
Display 3041 2021 0.152
Promotions 537 223 0.029
Organizations 2665 559 0.000
Consumer publicity 1002 520 0.072
7 Other than for merchandising, the marginal effects go 
negative at prices ranging from pf = 11,000 to pf = 406,513. 
For merchandising, the marginal effect becomes positive at pf 
= 18,313. Thus these rotation effects are very minor anywhere 
in our sample space.Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 48   July 2008
ton Apple Commission promotion increased quan-
tity demanded by approximately 11 or 14 percent, 
depending on whether the no-ad predicted value 
is compared to the actual market quantity or the 
model prediction (with ads), respectively. For 2001, 
the estimated percentage change in revenue was 
approximately ﬁve percent, approximately half of 
the estimated effect in 2002.
Total industry revenue is estimated to have 
been boosted by Washington Apple Commission 
promotions when compared to actual revenue, by 
$53.4 million for 2002 and $24.6 million in 2001. 
Furthermore, the average return to advertising 
reached over $8.70 per dollar and $3.75 per dollar 
in 2002 and 2001, respectively. This suggests that 
the industry beneﬁted substantially from Washing-
ton Apple Commission advertising. Our results sug-
gest a greater impact from generic advertising than 
do the estimates of Ward (1993) and other general 
fruit promotion predictions (Schmit, Reberte, and 
Kaiser 1997).8 
Summary and Conclusions
This study measures the impact of generic advertis-
ing on demand in the special case of the Washington 
Apple Commission. We ﬁnd that the Washington 
Apple Commission advertising positively affected 
the demand for Washington apples. The joint sig-
niﬁcance of all the advertising efforts suggests cu-
mulative effectiveness of Washington Apple Com-
mission promotion. Speciﬁcally, direct advertising, 
promotions, organization promotion, and consumer 
publicity positively affect the demand for Washing-
ton State apples. Washington Apple Commission 
promotion increased quantities demanded by nearly 
15 percent compared to the simulated world with 
no Washington Apple Commission activities. The 
average return for a Washington Apple Commis-
sion dollar spent topped $8. These results suggest 
the Washington Apple Commission greatly affected 
the demand for Washington apples and the revenue 
received by producers.
 Our results suggest that the elimination of the 
Washington Apple Commission negatively im-
pacted the Washington apple industry. However, 
apple growers could resume an effective joint ad-
vertising effort to continue to affect the demand for 
Washington apples and increase their revenues with 
voluntarily raised promotion funds. By examining 
the results for each advertising category we see that 
promotion through in-store displays, investment in 
other organizations, and consumer publicity gener-
ates the largest impact. We also observe that these 
activities received the least amount of funding. This 
suggests that using these forms of promotion could 
be effective with a relatively small budget. How-
ever, without the infrastructure of the Washington 
Apple Commission, coordinating these activities 
may be difﬁcult. Producers could hire a non-proﬁt 
or for-proﬁt organization to implement the volun-
tarily funded programs. To avoid these costs, or if 
coordination presents a signiﬁcant problem, grow-
ers could reap promotional beneﬁts simply by pro-
viding funds to the associated organizations. This 
would require little coordination and no program 
development and implementation costs. 
Clearly, the days of multi-million dollar promo-
tion budgets are over for the Washington State apple 
industry, but a focused small-scale campaign could 
positively impact revenues. However, not all pro-
ducers would choose to participate in a voluntary 
program. The classic free-rider problem provides 
an incentive for producers to enjoy the beneﬁts 
of promotion provided by others. Additionally, 
the Washington apple industry has become more 
diversiﬁed over time. Producers of new apple va-
rieties or organic products may prefer to fund more 
narrowly focused promotion.
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